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MONDAY, JANUARY 27, 1930

WHOLE No. 624

LIVING LATIN BOOK TWO

By
CLAIRE C. THURSBY
and
GRETCHEN D. KYNE

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Latin Grammar. By Herbert Charles Elmer. New York: The Macmillan Company (1928). Pp. xv + 327.

In order properly to review a Grammar it is necessary at the outset to formulate a definition of grammar. I suggest the following: Grammar consists in the phenomena of form, agreement, and government exhibited by a language. A Grammar supplies a statement and explanation of the forms of a language and an interpretation of the various phenomena of agreement and government exhibited by that language.

Interpretation is, of necessity, subjective. If, therefore, interpretations are made by a competent scholar, no other scholar, however competent, may rightfully or becomingly go further than to disagree with previous interpretations. He should not, except in the light of newly discovered evidence, pronounce previous interpretations *wrong*, unless he assumes—tacitly or otherwise—a greatly superior competency.

The Latin Grammar under consideration in this review obviously aims to displace from its high position of acceptance and popularity one of the most prominent Latin Grammars in existence, one that has been used and is being used with enormous success all over the land (the Grammar by the late Professor Charles E. Bennett, long Professor of Latin at Cornell University). Great scholars of the present day received their early training in grammar from this book. Yet this Grammar, in company with many others, whether extended or brief, is said by Professor Elmer to be wasting 75% of the learner's time!! In the name of scientific accuracy and of the present craze for educational statistics, *how* was this percentage *computed*? To *guess* at it would have been highly unscientific.

I purpose to examine this new Grammar in some detail, and to determine, if possible, the extent to which the claims made for it by its author are justified. We have here, in effect, a Grammar with a double Preface. First, a pamphlet of forty pages, entitled *Is There Need of Another Latin Grammar*¹, was written by the author of the Latin Grammar under review, and published, two years or so ago, by the same firm. This pamphlet was widely distributed, gratis. In this pamphlet the author set forth item by item, sometimes even section by section, the many points in which his forthcoming Grammar was to be superior to all other Grammars, and denounced what he regarded as

actual errors in Grammars already published. So far as I have discovered, only one of these Grammars (Bennett's) is actually quoted by excerpts from its numbered sections. The reader is thereby positively enabled to identify the target of criticism, though the offending work is not named! Similar claims and criticisms are freely made in the Preface to the Latin Grammar itself. In my discussion of the Latin Grammar I shall follow closely the statements made in these two places, and shall compare the treatment of these matters in the present volume with their treatment by other grammarians, and by one of them especially. Professor Elmer's attitude toward this one Latin Grammar may be summed up in Zola's famous *J'accuse*.

First, let us consider the treatment of forms. With the author's belief in the uselessness of discussing, for beginners, the stems of the first, second, fourth, and fifth declensions I am wholly in accord. But is he not here confusing a Latin Grammar with a First-Year Latin Book? The presentation of facts in a Grammar should be scientifically accurate and complete in every detail. Pedagogic presentation is the function of the First-Year Book, which should never be a mere echo of the Grammar on which it may be, in its main outlines, based. There might well have been a paragraph in Professor Elmer's Latin Grammar indicating the inadvisability of presenting these stems to beginners—who, by the way, never use a Grammar. But the presentation should have been made in the body of the book. The author feels it necessary to include such stems in an Appendix (Appendix B, Noun Stems, pages 267-269). However, by incorporating them in the body of his book he might have secured further condensation and further compression of the size of the book. But, for the proper understanding of the *third* declension the stems are vitally needed, even by beginners. The forms of declension must be understood as well as memorized. Mere memory, divorced from understanding, will get the beginner nowhere. If a pupil has any initiative whatever, the question 'why' will always loom large before him. To tell a beginner, as is done in Section 28 (I shall cite throughout by sections), that "Like *cōsul* are declined: *princeps* . . . , *frāter* . . . , *virgō* . . . , *virtūs* . . . , *bōs* . . ." is simply to give him a hopelessly confusing bit of misinformation. I of course admit that the directions contained in 27 are thoroughly workable. But nothing can convince a child—or me—that *virgo* is declined "Like *cōsul*". The child's attention is naturally fixed upon the nominative, as the form which he first meets visually and aurally, the form by which even the teacher always speaks of the noun, the form which *is the noun*; he therefore believes the evidence of his own eyes that *virgo* is *not* declined like *consul* and that *femur* is not declined like *genus*. The author is, in

¹Reference may be made here to Professor Elmer's article, *Some Shortcomings of Our Latin Grammars*, THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.59-62, 67-70. On the front cover-page of the Pamphlet to which Dr. Mitchell refers the following statement appears: "Reprinted in part from *The Classical Weekly*, December 6, 13, 1926". I had no idea that such a pamphlet was in preparation until a copy of the finished pamphlet reached me as part of the publisher's advertising campaign meant to 'promote' the new Grammar. As the result of correspondence the publishers apologized profusely for the failure to observe the amenities of editorial and publicational courtesy. Professor Elmer himself, I may add, was not to blame, he had supposed that the publishers had observed the proprieties. C. K. >.

fact, commanding the child to fasten his attention upon the stems without telling him what this strange bit of framework is upon which he is to hang an assortment of endings. To say that the information can be obtained from the Appendix is beside the mark. Why give two different statements in the same book concerning the same topic?

The criticisms levelled at presenting the classification of consonants also seem to me misdirected. Even a child can understand the physiological basis of alphabetical classification and the production by distinct and separate actions of the organs of speech of the sounds marked by letters. For the third declension, therefore, I consider it highly desirable to treat accurately the stems—especially the consonant stems—and to classify on a physiological basis the sounds marked by the letters. Besides, attention to these details certainly will not consume 75% of the pupil's time and energy; the time and energy it does consume are well spent.

The presentation of the verb-forms is excellent. I cannot seriously object to the grouping of theme vowels, tense signs, and personal endings as *tense endings* without resolution into their component elements, although that again concerns more particularly the First-Year Book. It really does save the pupil's time and gray matter. The translations given for the paradigms of the verb, especially for the perfect passive participle, are superior to those given by other Grammars.

In the domain of syntax I shall consider some of the strictures levelled by Professor Elmer at interpretations given by certain Grammars—or by one of them—previously published. First I desire to acknowledge freely that there has been in Professor Elmer's book a very welcome improvement in many points. In general, the rules as set forth by Professor Elmer are clearly stated, and they *work*. Some few of them, it is true, are distinctly inferior to the treatment of given subjects by other grammarians. These will be noted as they are met.

The interpretation of *in* with the ablative as indicating *rest* alone is really a curious lapse noticeable in several excellent Grammars (e. g. Bennett, 143; Lane, 1423); but motion or activity within a place is clearly recognized by Allen and Greenough (426, 3, example 3) and by Gildersleeve-Lodge (385, example 1). I regard the statement in Professor Elmer's book (207, 2) as superior to anything I have found elsewhere. So, in general, is the treatment of the entire subject of prepositions; it is clear, concise, adequate, time-saving. In a manner of speaking, Professor Elmer has brought the preposition back into its own; he has made far clearer the nature of prepositional phrases and has simplified their terminology. Thus, in any prepositional phrase the case of the noun is dependent solely upon the preposition. The meaning and the force of the phrase have nothing whatever to do with determining the case of the noun. For example, the expression 'Ablative of Place Where' is, in more ways

than one, an incorrect term². The usage involved is correctly described as an 'Ablative governed by the Preposition *in* in a Phrase signifying Place in Which or on Which'. Indeed, the general idea of 'Place Where' is so varied in its connotations that it may be inherent in many other prepositional phrases. The idea may evidently be expressed also by the accusative with one or other of the following prepositions: *ante*, *apud*, *circa*, *circum*, *cis*, *citra*, *extra*, *infra*, *inter*, *intra*, *iuxta*, *per*, *post*, *praeter*, *prope*, *subter*, *super*, *supra*, *trans*, *ultra*. Hence, if we speak of an Ablative of Place Where—or, a little less inaccurately—of an Ablative of Place in Which or on Which, we must also invent an Accusative of the Thing near Which, because *apud urbem* means 'near the city'; and, if we speak of an Ablative of Agency because *ab* with the ablative expresses the idea of agency, we must also have an Accusative of Cause because *ob hanc rem* means 'because of this fact (circumstance)'. An amusing list of the absurdities into which we are logically led by the mistaken terminology which ascribes the prepositional meaning to the case of the noun is given on pages 34–35 of the Pamphlet. But even Professor Elmer nods in this connection, for, when he states (210, 1), that "Agency is regularly expressed by the preposition *ab* (*ā*) with the ablative of the person (or personified thing)", he fails utterly to mention the fact that in this construction *the verb must be passive*. Agency with an active verb is expressed by *per* with the accusative³.

Our author puts his lance in rest and tilts against the treatment by other grammarians of dative-governing verbs. On pages 3–8 of the Pamphlet he criticises very bitterly the statement almost universally made in this form, that the dative is used with many verbs of certain significations <given in English>; he enumerates 23 English words used in the statements. This is of course cumbrous and of small aid to the pupil in mastering the principle from the Latin side. It is infinitely better, and indeed easier, for the pupil to learn the 19 commonest Latin verbs which govern the dative, thereby at once enriching his Latin vocabulary and enlarging his syntactical knowledge, than to labor with 23 English verbs which aid not at all the acquisition of Latin words. But is the author quite fair in neglecting to point out that these 19 Latin verbs actually do convey exclusively the ideas expressed by the 23 English verbs? Besides, these 19 verbs concern first-year books only; in Section 166 of Professor Elmer's Grammar itself no less than 38 verbs are listed as governing the dative. Bennett

²In general, I think it rather childish to fuss about the matter of priority in the presentation in print of this or that view. But in view of the nature of Professor Elmer's strictures, expressed in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.59–62, 67–70, in the Pamphlet to which Dr. Mitchell refers, and in the Preface to his Latin Grammar, I am justified, I think, in pointing out that, as long ago as January 23, 1909, I published in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 2.97–98 an editorial on Inaccuracies of Language in Classical Teaching in which I set forth, as clearly as Professor Elmer has ever done, the point so highly commended here by Dr. Mitchell. I have also discussed the matter elsewhere in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY. In THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.69, Note 9, Professor Elmer (at my suggestion, as it happens), had called attention to my remarks in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 2.97. C. K. >

³Is it agency, or is it instrumentality? C. K. >

falls short of full statement by giving no list at all of dative-governing Latin verbs. Gildersleeve-Lodge list 63 such verbs; Allen and Greenough give 26, admitting incompleteness. Lane gives no complete list, but warns the reader that English meanings are an unsafe guide. Again, Professor Elmer (Pamphlet, 6) examines the usage with verbs signifying *injure*. He finds 10 governing the accusative: *laedo* (always listed as an exception to the rule about the dative), *violo*, *vitio*, *corrumpo*, *afflicto*, *iniuriar*, *imminuo*, *infesto*, *obsolefacio*, *obduco*. Let us examine these verbs. Despite the inclusion of *injure* among their meanings as given in the dictionary, I am confident that this meaning is about the last that would suggest itself offhand to a competent translator of a passage in which one of them might occur, except in the cases of *laedo* and *iniuriar*. Now, *iniuriar* is post-Augustan and rare, as are also *afflicto* (in this sense), *infesto*, and *obsolefacio*. An injury inflicted by *imminuo* is always an injury through impairment or enfeeblement. Finally, *obduco* is thus used only by an obscure medical writer, Caelius Aurelianus (c. 420 A.D.), in a treatise entitled *Tardae Passiones*. The treatment of the subject in Professor Elmer's Grammar (166-167) is brief, clear, and satisfactory; but why are these strained arguments set forth in the Preface? Why not allow the readers of the Grammar to draw their own conclusions? Further, with reference to these 19 (or more) verbs, the assumption that the Romans themselves felt these words as signifying *do harm (to)*, *be obedient (to)*, etc., seems wholly gratuitous. How do we know what the Romans felt in reference to them? They merely used them *as if they so felt them*. All we need to do is to teach the pupils to feel these verbs in this connotation, and the problem is solved. The significations assigned to these verbs in 166, as well as in the text of 167, are admirable and will surely remove many perplexities and save some time and effort. But why should the Romans feel *auxilior* as affecting them differently from *adiuvo*, which (apparently) violates two familiar rules, one based upon its meaning of *help*, the other based on its being a prepositional compound?

Professor Elmer's formulation (168) of the rule for prepositional compounds which govern the dative is, by the way, a model of clearness and accuracy, though I fail to see wherein the "many verbs" of Bennett's statement (187, II) is greatly inferior to the "often" of Professor Elmer (168). The formulation of the fundamental principle involved in the differentiation between prepositional and adverbial force in the prefixed preposition is admirable, though it would certainly seriously tax a beginner's powers of clear thinking to detect the difference. Lane (1188) clearly implies the same distinction. After all, the fact remains that the usual list of prepositions figuring in this construction (*ad*, *ante*, etc.) is practically exhaustive. All the examples given in Professor Elmer's Grammar are limited to them, except one with *circum*—and *circum* is included in some lists. I may add that the advanced Latin Grammar used in the École Normale Supérieure of Paris (by Riemann and Goelzer) restricts

the rule to the standard list. But Professor Elmer's statement is different in phrasing—which may well have been its *raison d'être*.

In 170 I should greatly prefer the term Dative of the Possessor (Professor Elmer's term is Dative of Possession). The reference in this construction is always to a person or to a personified noun which exercises the possession, i. e. is the possessor. The term Dative of Separation (173, 1) I consider most unfortunate and confusing, as well as positively inaccurate. The problem of all noun syntax in its government by verbs is simply this: What is the relation of the noun concerned in the construction to the verb? Let us examine the construction in the light of a conspicuous example of it, *scuto... militi detraxit... processit* (Caesar, De Bello Gallico 2.25.2), 'seizing a shield from a soldier... he ran forward'. A direct object is defined as a person or a thing which receives directly the action of the verb, an indirect object is defined as the person or the thing which receives indirectly the action of the verb. The phrasing in Caesar's account of the event is equivalent to *scutum... militi detraxit et... processit*, 'He seized a shield from a soldier and ran forward'. Here the shield received directly the action of *detraxit*, and the soldier was indirectly affected by that action, that is, *militi* is a simple indirect object whose relation to the verb is, logically, exactly the same as is that of *militi* in *scutum... militi dedit*. The difference between the English prepositions used in translating the two examples affects the logic of the situation not at all. But Professor Elmer (167) defines indirect object in the light of the English preposition *to*, a definition which is, decidedly, a makeshift. The beginner will inevitably confuse this so-called Dative of Separation with the legitimate Ablative of Separation, to his undoing. I have seen this occur, time and again, in the classroom.

On page 9 of his Pamphlet Professor Elmer asks, in a caption, "Must the Genitive be a Puzzle?", and then proceeds to make the genitive as much of a puzzle as skilled sophistry can compass. Fortunately, the Grammar itself is clear. It is a pleasure to find its treatment of that *bête noire* of pupils, the genitive with adjectives, superior to that of all the Grammars I have examined except Lane (1263-1270); there, too, the point of departure is the Latin adjective, not the English. I heartily welcome the assignment to the adjectives listed of such significations as will suggest a governed genitive in line with the English *of*. Indeed the translation of the examples throughout the book aims to bring the English idiom into accord with the Latin wherever that is possible and to render them mutually illustrative. This is worth all the flowery translations in the world, and certainly makes for clearer and quicker understanding.

Professor Elmer in his discussion of the Genitive with Impersonal verbs again, in the Pamphlet (17-18), makes Bennett's Grammar the target for his heavy artillery. True, Bennett's phrasing of the rule (209) is the least satisfactory of those in the Grammars I have examined; yet I cannot but consider the genitive

with these impersonals as causal rather than objective (see Gildersleeve-Lodge, 377; Allen and Greenough, 354; Riemann-Goelzer, 388; Harkness, 457). Again, this seems to be a mere matter of interpretation.

In the discussion of the constructions with *rēfert* and *interest*, all the Grammars (including that of the École Normale, by Riemann and Goelzer) except Gildersleeve-Lodge seem utterly to overlook the priority of *rēfert* and the mere analogy of *interest* with it⁴. This point is very clearly brought out by Professor Elmer (161).

I unreservedly approve of tossing into the discard, as Professor Elmer has done (Pamphlet, 12-13), the multiplied subdivisions of the direct object. A direct object is a direct object, and that is all that the pupil need tell about it. If a scholar wishes to vex (or amuse) himself with a dozen different kinds of direct objects, that is his privilege.

It is confusing to make (187) the Ablative of Separation signify both Place from Which (an idea always involving motion) and Freedom or Exclusion (a totally different idea). The name should logically be applied to the second idea only; the first should be left as a phase of place relation. Further, it seems strange to identify source as a phase of separation (187, 2). An independent heading, Ablative of Source or Origin, would appear to be demanded for this usage: Bennett, Lane, Allen and Greenough, Gildersleeve-Lodge, and Harkness so treat the matter. Perhaps the unanimity accounts for the change.

What is the need to formulate an Ablative of Route by Which? The route of travel is simply a phase of the idea of means. Perhaps the author would restrict the means of travel to the vehicle of transport, which seems rather instrumental in its nature. This again is a matter of opinion.

The least satisfactory portion of the book is the treatment of the Ablative Absolute. This tremendously important construction receives no explanation whatever. I quote in full the text proper of the section involved (197).

... **Ablative absolute**, corresponding to such English expressions as *this being the case*, *this done*. It consists of the ablative of a noun or pronoun with the ablative of a participle, an adjective, or another noun or pronoun used predicatively in agreement with it. It may be variously translated to suit the context. . . .

That is all. For a learner it passeth understanding—or defieeth it. If a pupil of mine should ever render an ablative absolute after the model here given, he would hear from me quickly and (I hope) effectively. The ablative absolute is an equivalent or abbreviation of a clause of some kind. What that kind is is a matter of interpretation for pupil and teacher. It is a construction calling for the most careful elucidation. It is a difficult subject thoroughly to understand; yet it is dismissed here in a curt paragraph of 52 words. Some discussion of the clausal nature of every ablative absolute is not merely *advisable*; it is an imperative necessity.

⁴I have taught this, myself, for over forty years. C. K. >.

I pass now to Professor Elmer's treatment of the syntax of the verb. In general his exposition of verb-syntax and of the syntax of the dependent clause is extremely lucid and easily understood and mastered. The phrasing of the General Rule for the Use of Negatives (278) seems an improvement over prior attempts at explaining this subject. But the arrangement so blithely criticised on page 23 of the Pamphlet *works*, and it has quite too much intellectual support to be called a "hodgepodge". The section (278) misses an opportunity in not adopting the author's own suggestion of tabulation. Why not write thus: *neve* (*neu*): *ne:: neque: non?* Following the text of 278, this little formula packs the matter in a nutshell.

Let us now consider Substantive Clauses Developed from the Volitive. In the Pamphlet the author says (page 24), "One of our best and most popular grammars states that substantive clauses developed from the volitive are used with the following classes of verbs", and then proceeds to enumerate seven. What Grammar is this? Bennett's, of course. In fact, in identifying the grammar(s) whose sins are catalogued, we might almost be guided in our search by the suggestion contained in Cicero's famous words (*De Lege Agraria* 2.22): *Quis legem tulit? Rullus. Quis maiorem partem populi suffragiis privavit? Rullus. Quis comitiis praeftuit...? Idem Rullus!* Professor Elmer's Grammar (303, 1) gives a very greatly condensed statement ("Volitive Clauses. . . used with verbs that involve expression of the will"), but I believe that a more detailed statement is the more easily comprehended by the immature mind. 'Will' is a queer concept, after all—far too queer to be absolutely clear to boys and girls. I venture to suggest a form of statement that appears to me (perhaps wrongly), not more brief, but simpler and easier to understand: 'Volitive clauses are those which depend on verbs which put (i. e. will) another verb into action, or cause (i. e. will) the cessation of that action; they express the purpose of the governing verb'. Make it clear that volitive clauses are, after all, merely a phase of purpose clauses⁵. The author hits hard at difficult terminology (Pamphlet, 28). Why not begin by eliminating the word 'volitive', so strange to the pupil? I claim, from long experience, that this word means *absolutely nothing* to the beginner until it has been explained and explained and explained again.

We come to the subject of Tense Sequence. This was once supposed to be fairly difficult. I quote from the Pamphlet (24):

It has long seemed to me that the treatment of the Sequence of Tenses is one of the most unsatisfactory features of our present-day grammars. The rule of sequence, as usually given, is inconsistent, self-contradictory, obscure, and unworkable at almost every point. Who can make head or tail, for instance, out of the following contradictions found in one of our best and most popular grammars?

It is incontestable that an author who, in writing on a scientific subject, produces matter that is "inconsistent, self-contradictory, obscure, and unworkable at almost

⁵This statement seems to me a complete reversal of the truth. C. K. >.

every point", is writing from the depths of his ignorance. *Quis est hic reus? Idem Rullus* (see Bennett, 258; 268; 267; 268, 7, b; 318; 267, 3). Yet, if these sections be read in their entirety, they seem much more consistent and reasonable than when they are considered in the confused order suggested by the Pamphlet (see above). Here two authorities disagree. Two scholars do not see eye to eye or interpret mind to mind; who shall decide between them, especially since one of them had already passed into the beyond when these strictures were published and could not even attempt to rebut the charges? Again, the terms 'Primary, Secondary', 'Principal, Historical', draw a formidable barrage from Professor Elmer. He wishes them discarded, "banished altogether", as having no meanings that make them in the least appropriate for the tenses to which they are applied. Well, what of it? They are defined (Bennett, 258) by the very terms which Professor Elmer would substitute for them. They are merely technical terms devised—or, rather, employed—to convey technical meanings, and in no Grammar are they defined otherwise than correctly. It is the same with a host of technical terms. To require every technical term to be appropriately descriptive would wreck the English language. Does 'cog' describe anything or convey any meaning at all to one who has never seen a cog-wheel? How about 'cam' and 'grommet'? In the field of linguistics how about the 'masculine caesura', or the 'feminine caesura'? These were considered perfectly adequate, though utterly inappropriate, terms by which to indicate two leading types of caesura, until somebody thought he discovered that there wasn't any such thing at all. In the Pamphlet (26), Professor Elmer says:

<Section> 268, 7, b, <Idem Rullus> states that, in such sentences as *nescio quid causae fuerit cur nullas ad me litteras dares*, the Perfect Subjunctive *fuerit* is a Secondary (Historical) Tense, 'as shown by the following Imperfect Subjunctive.' But the pupil has just learned from 267 that this same *fuerit* is a Primary Tense used because a Primary Tense must follow the Primary Tense *nescio*. The student is here told that *fuerit* is both Primary and Secondary at one and the same time. The sentence is given in the <Bennett> grammar as one of the peculiarities (exceptions) to the rule for sequence. In reality there is nothing peculiar or exceptional about it. It is a perfectly normal Latin sentence in strict accord with the rule for sequence, when the rule is properly formulated. In fact, I have given this sentence in my grammar as a particularly good illustration of the regular working of the rule.

I regret that, after what I consider careful search, I have failed to find it in Professor Elmer's Grammar. Of course it may have escaped me. Professor Elmer's words, if true, constitute a strong indictment. However, the saving clause in Bennett was not quoted. In 268, 7, b Professor Bennett says: "We may have a principal tense followed by a Perfect Subjunctive used *historically*" (the italics are mine). This seems to take the sting of reproach and the stigma of ignorance out of the supplementary remark with which the section closes, "Here *fuerit* is historical<ly> used", as is shown by the following imperfect subjunctive". A bit unhappily worded this, it is true. But even Pro-

fessor Elmer is compelled to state (260), "For vivid representation the present tense is often rhetorically used in the sense of the historical perfect..." In such a case the present tense of the indicative is certainly an historical tense; or, if that terminology offend, we may say that it refers to past time. This phenomenon is exceedingly common in English: witness newspaper headlines every day. Difference of opinion in a matter of interpretation is all too readily characterized as error. Orthodoxy is, after all, rather a subjective quality. I admit freely and gladly that the treatment of the subject of Sequence of Tenses in Professor Elmer's Grammar is eminently satisfactory. It is clear, brief, brilliant—and the rules *work*. But taking the Grammar and the Pamphlet together, we have a strong analogy with the building trades: it seems a pity that a structure which touches the stars with its exalted head must be demolished and scrapped merely that a newer may be erected.

One place where Professor Elmer's clarity of statement appears to fail him is in his definition of characterizing clauses. This definition is not clear, and the very essence of such clauses is not stated. The best brief statement explaining these clauses that I have found in any Grammars are given by Bennett (283) and by Allen and Greenough (535). The key to the understanding of clauses of characteristic seems to me to lie in the fact that in them the relative clause is descriptive and not enumerative. This point Professor Elmer's Grammar does not bring out at all.

The difficult subject of the Potential Subjunctive is well and clearly set forth. There has been in recent years a decided swing of grammatical theory toward Professor Elmer's views concerning these *would, should, may, might, can, could* clauses. Here particularly the controversial little Pamphlet plies its sting, like Socrates's gadfly. We read, on page 37, this statement: "...One of my chief critics <Idem Rullus> admits (Grammar, § 280) that" the *can, could, may, might* usage "is confined mainly to a few phrases like *dicat aliquis, dixerit aliquis*..." Then Professor Elmer claims, and with high probability, that *dixerit* is a Future Perfect indicative, and he notes the extreme rarity of the idiom with *dicat*. He comes as near to

<I would refer Dr. Mitchell, Professor Elmer, and the readers of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY to THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.70, Note 3. For convenience I copy the Note here in full:

"...I [= Professor Elmer] may refer now to Professor Knapp's remarks in American Journal of Philology 32 (1911), 340-341, made in the course of his review of Bennett, The Syntax of Early Latin. Vol. I—The Verb. See also his note on *forsitan*, Aeneid 2.506.

<I [= Professor Knapp] venture to add that my convictions regarding the so-called Potential Subjunctive were reached in complete independence of Professor Elmer's views—indeed, long before I knew that he had any definite views on the subject. A passage often regarded as exhibiting a Potential Subjunctive (a 'may' subjunctive) is Horace, Sermones 1.3.19 *Nunc aliquis dicat mihi*. I remember that I wrote to Professor Elmer, many years ago, suggesting that this could perfectly well mean 'At this point let some one say to me', that is, in effect, 'Assuming, for the sake of argument, that some one says', etc. I added that, so long as this possible rendering was in entire harmony with the 'genius of the Latin language', no one had a right to cite the passage as a (definitive) example of the Potential Subjunctive. Professor Elmer replied that this explanation had never occurred to him. No one of us possesses all truth, or thinks of all possibilities—always. C. K.>".

Again I say that, in view of Professor Elmer's strictures, I think it well worth while to call attention to my views. When Professor Elmer published the pamphlet, he had learned nothing from this note. C. K.>.

proving his contentions as any one can come to *proving* what is, and ever must be, subjective, a matter of opinion. Into this more or less complicated discussion it is useless to adventure further.

It is a pity that this new Grammar (and the rest of them as well, with the conspicuous and welcome exception of Allen and Greenough) does not employ in the classification of conditional sentences the terminology employed by Goodwin in his Greek Grammar. Greek is not yet wholly extinct in education; and it is an inestimable advantage to Secondary School students of the Classics to have so important a topic as the conditional sentence classified in the two languages in exactly the same fashion. There are some things good enough to be imitated even by a scholar. Worship of the 'originality' fetish has led many a worker into difficulties.

A conspicuous weakness of this new Latin Grammar lies in the fact that the examples quoted as illustrations are not located, or even assigned to their respective authors⁷. This, it seems to me, is a serious defect. A teacher who desires to read for himself (and some of the guild still desire this) the complete passage containing a given example is utterly unable to locate it unless he possesses either a profound knowledge of the Latin corpus or phenomenal luck.

Again, I fail to see why, in our most recently published brief Grammars, the subjects of prosody and versification are so meagerly treated. It is a pity that any Grammar should ever be written which affords no clue whatever to the meters of Horace.

The make-up of Professor Elmer's book is remarkable for accuracy. I have detected no misprints. A few may, however, crop up in class-room use.

Let me sum up. Any reviewer will find portions of any book which fail to meet his ideas and standards. This Grammar, as a whole, is excellent, a step forward *nearly* all along the line—but one must also read between its lines.

CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL,
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

B. W. MITCHELL

The Suasoriae of Seneca the Elder. Introductory Essay, Text, Translation and Explanatory Notes: Being the 'Liber Suasoriarum' of the Work Entitled L. Annaei Senecae Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores. By William A. Edward. Cambridge: At the University Press (1928). Pp. xlvii+160.

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the great French savant, Gaston Boissier, in his article entitled *The Schools of Declamation at Rome*¹, wrote of Seneca the Elder as follows:

⁷This defect characterized the first edition of Bennett's Latin Grammar (1895 to 1908). The 1908 edition was called "A Revised Edition printed March, 1908". In the 1918 (third) edition, called *A New Latin Grammar* ("A revision of that published in 1908") Professor Bennett added an Index to the Sources of the Illustrative Examples Cited in the Syntax. C. K. >

⁸See his *Tacitus and Other Roman Studies*, translated by W. G. Hutchinson, 163 (New York and London, 1906). The article referred to above originally appeared in *Revue des deux Mondes* 2 (1902), 480-508.

Seneca the father's book on declamation, despite the interest it affords, is little known to the public. It has not been translated into French since 1663, when it was done very badly, and I do not believe there exists a single version in any foreign language. The fact is that it is a difficult task, well calculated to daunt the most intrepid translator. . . .

France, however, produced a translator of Seneca the Elder in the person of Professor Henri Bornecque, whose text and edition still remain a standard work. Two German scholars, Müller and Kiessling, produced excellent editions of the text². Further, several dissertations on Seneca the Elder have appeared in Germany³. But I do not know of any translation of his work into the German language. In the United States Dr. Thomas S. Simonds produced a dissertation on Seneca the Elder⁴. In England, however, practically nothing was done until the appearance of Dr. Edward's book. This, too, is only a partial edition, since it takes into consideration only the Suasoriae. Yet, we are greatly indebted to Dr. Edward, since the Suasoriae give us much information and throw much light upon the character of such great personages as Cicero, Asinius Pollio, Messala Corvinus, and many others.

The Contents of Dr. Edward's book are as follows: I. Introductory Essay (ix-xlvi); II. The Text (1-37); III. The Translation (39-82); IV. The Notes (83-156); Index (157-160).

The Introductory Essay gives a sympathetic and accurate account of Seneca the Elder, and traces everything that has any bearing on his much neglected book. In the first place, Dr. Edward corrects the misleading statements that have crept into some of the English textbooks on Latin literature⁵: Seneca the Elder was not a rhetorician, since he never was a professional teacher of rhetoric (x). Further, very interesting is his conclusion that Seneca wrote his book for the public, and not, as Boissier assumed, for his children; however, in writing it, Seneca ". . . adopts and maintains the artistic illusion that he is writing merely to gratify the curiosity of his children" (xi). His work is characterized (xii) as ". . . in a way an anthology of the oratory of the rhetoricians, but it is an anthology, if one may use the term, both of what is good and of what is bad".

The discussion of the theory of rhetoric and of the origin and development of declamation at Rome, as well as of the causes that brought about the popularity of declamation (xiii-xx), is sound and up-to-date. It may be recommended as a good introduction to the subject. The same is true of the section which treats

²For the dates of all these editions see Dr. Edward's discussion of the text, xxxix.

³I observe that Dr. Edward does not list in his Bibliography (xlv-xlvi) the dissertations of G. Hoffa, *De Seneca Patre, Quaestiones Selectae* (Göttingen, 1909), and H. T. Karsten, *De Eleutione Rhetorica Qualis Invenitur in Annaei Senecae Controversiis et Suasoriis* (Leyden, 1881).

⁴The *Themes Treated by the Elder Seneca*, Johns Hopkins University Dissertation (Baltimore, 1896). This dissertation is not listed in Dr. Edward's Bibliography.

⁵That Dr. Edward does not mention the excellent discussion of Professor J. D. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age*, 42-60 (London and New York, 1927; see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 23.44-47), is excusable on the ground that the latter's work appeared shortly before Dr. Edward's; the failure, however, to mention Professor W. C. Summers's book, *The Silver Age of Latin Literature*, 232-259 (London, 1920; New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1920), is, perhaps, somewhat reprehensible.

the work and procedure in Roman Schools (xx-xxii). Dr. Edward does not accept the conventional date for the birth of Seneca (58-55 B. C.), but produces sound evidence (xxiv) that it is not "... necessary ... to put Seneca's birth at an earlier date than 50 B. C."

Professor Boissier, in the essay referred to above (see note 1), called Seneca's Latin harsh and obscure. Dr. Edward's opinion is worth quoting (xxvi):

<Seneca's book> ... does not give one the impression of being a hasty or ill-considered work. ... Seneca's own style is well-formed, lucid, strong and balanced, and singularly pure. The form of the work, artistic in the extreme, indicates long and careful consideration. ...

Although Dr. Edward's book is limited to the *Suasoriae*, he did well in giving a brief account of the *Controversiae* (xxxi-xxxiii); he thus presents a full picture of Seneca's work. He based his text chiefly on Müller's edition (xxxvii), but he incorporated into it several suggestions and emendations by other scholars, particularly of Bornecque, and added some of his own. Compare e. g. his defense of *piis oratoribus* in 6.19 (142) and his suggestion for 6.10.4 (138).

The translation runs smoothly and does full justice to the original. The Notes, historical and explanatory in character, are very full, and contain a good deal of information which both teacher and student will find of great assistance. Very helpful also is the part entitled "Notes on the Declaimers" whose names occur in the *Suasoriae* (xl-xlvi). Since so little has been written on Seneca, Dr. Edward gives in his Bibliography (xlv-xlvi) a list of books and articles which have some bearing on the *Suasoriae*. Here I note the inclusion of Aulard's dissertation on Asinius Pollio. It is apparent that Dr. Edward is not acquainted with a more recent discussion by Miss Elizabeth D. Pierce, *A Roman Man of Letters, Gaius Asinius Pollio* (Columbia University Dissertation, New York, 1922). I am also surprised that no mention is made of E. Norden's great work, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig, 1915), especially 1.278-299, 300, where a discussion of the form and the content of the declamation is to be found. On the whole, however, Dr. Edward has produced a creditable piece of work, all the more so since his translation and commentary are the first in the English language. Let us hope that there will some day appear an edition of the *Controversiae*, too, bearing his name.

HUNTER COLLEGE,
NEW YORK CITY

JACOB HAMMER

MR. FABIAN FRANKLIN ON OLD AGE

Clemenceau died at the age of eighty-eight; he had passed well beyond seventy-five when he entered upon that chapter of his life which alone made him an im-

portant factor in the world's history. When one couples with this the rôle of another French Septuagenarian—Foch, who was the military, as Clemenceau was the civilian, creator of victory—, one can hardly fail to be reminded of the oft-discussed question of the potentialities of old age.

Twenty-five years ago a strange commotion was stirred up by something that was said on this subject by a great physician—a man equally admired for his professional work, his influence upon medical education, his delightful personality, and his literary accomplishments. When Dr. Osler was about to leave The Johns Hopkins University and round out his splendid career as regius professor of medicine at Oxford, he made a farewell speech in which he combined wit and wisdom, humor and seriousness. But the delight with which his address was heard by those who had the good fortune to be present was soon clouded by an experience which must have been almost as distressing to his friends and admirers as to Dr. Osler himself.

A portion of the address was devoted to the subject of old age; and in one passage of this portion he referred, in a tone of playful acquiescence, to the notion that had been put forward by some earlier writer that it would be well if men who were approaching the age of sixty permitted themselves to be gently ushered out of the struggle of life by the administration of chloroform. This passage, which no person of the least intelligence could have possibly regarded as meant to be taken seriously, was pounced upon as a serious deliverance by many of our newspapers, and by not a few was exploited in a disgracefully sensational way. That a man like Osler should have suffered such an infliction must ever be a humiliating reflection to every intelligent American.

But the impression, which is widely current, that all the stir over Dr. Osler's speech was the creation of irresponsible newspapers is entirely false. Dr. Osler did state seriously, and afterwards reiterated, the opinion that the work of men above the age of sixty was of scant value to the world; and he made another assertion far more important, which justly attracted widespread and serious attention. Of what has been achieved by men after reaching the age of forty, he said:

"Take the sum of human achievement in action, in science, in art, in literature—subtract the work of the men above forty, and while we should miss great treasures, even priceless treasures, we would practically be where we are today. It is difficult to name a great and far-reaching conquest of the mind which has not been given to the world by a man on whose back the sun was still shining. The effective, moving, vitalizing work of the world is done between the ages of twenty-five and forty—."

This was undoubtedly a settled conviction of Dr. Osler's; in a volume published two years later he indicated his adherence to it and also to his view of the work of men above sixty.

Nevertheless, the proposition he laid down is so utterly discordant with the facts that it is difficult to see how it could have found a permanent lodgment in a mind like Osler's. History is so full of instances to the contrary that it is out of the question to dismiss them as mere exceptions to a general rule. Turn wheresoever you will and you are confronted with them. In our own history, we have only to remember that Washington was forty-three before he began to play any part other than that of a Virginia provincial, and that he was fifty-one when, after having brought the American colonies safely through the War of the Revolution, he played a not less remarkable and not less indispensable part in making possible their permanent union as a great nation; and that Franklin, whose part in the creation of our nation was second only to Washington's, had reached the age of three score and ten at the time of the Declaration of Independence.

<In a four-page periodical called New York, from which at various times, material has been reproduced in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY, there has been, recently, a series of short articles on Clemenceau. The third of these, entitled *Apropos of Clemenceau—III. Old Age*, which appeared in Volume 3, Number 50 (December 14, 1929), is reprinted here. Every one will, of course, at once recall Cicero, *Cato Maior Sive De Senectute* and will remember how vigorously Cicero insists that the work of the world—the more important work of the world—is carried on by *senes*. My memory tells me, what I have no chance to verify as I write this 800 miles away from my books, that my friend and colleague, Professor Frank Gardner Moore, in his admirable edition of the *De Senectute* (American Book Company), has given, in the Introduction, a long list of elders, ancient and modern, who, in advanced age, played an important part in the world's affairs. C. K.>

But mere piling up of instances, even so remarkable as these, is of small effect in comparison with the citation of one example of overshadowing impressiveness. Socrates was forty-one when his disciple Plato was born and Plato was forty-five when his disciple Aristotle first saw the light. The dominion of Aristotle over men's minds is measured in its duration not by centuries, but by millennia. Surely no one would say that it would have made little difference to the world if Socrates had terminated his activities before Plato was born, and thirty-one years before the actual close of his own career; if Plato had ceased to teach and write before Aristotle was born, and forty-one years before his own death; or if Aristotle had ceased to contribute to the thought of the world twenty-two years before the time when he actually closed his vast labors.

The origin of Dr. Osler's error is probably to be found in his preoccupation with questions of scientific discovery. Even there instances contradictory to his view might easily be cited; but the correction of it is to be found rather in the direction of logic than in that of mere historical enumeration. Such instances, indeed, as those of Darwin and Pasteur are on their face striking enough—Darwin was fifty when *The Origin of Species* was published, and Pasteur was nearly sixty when he turned his attention to far-reaching pathological research. But it might be said as regards all such instances that the real impulse towards these great achievements, the creative thought behind them, came at a much earlier age; and here is where the question of logic comes in. The bent of a man's mind, the direction of his endeavors, the inspiration that guides him, is determined before the age of forty; it would be wondrous strange if it were otherwise. But, once committed to a great intellectual undertaking, this committal itself is sufficient to account for his not

initiating any new activity of equal moment, unrelated to that to which his intellectual powers are already dedicated. That Darwin did not take up, after the age of forty, some other idea as fruitful as that embodied in *The Origin of Species* demands no explanation on the score of impotence; it is amply accounted for by the fact that a lifetime is all too short for the demands of such a task as that which he had laid upon himself, and to the fulfillment of which he had bent all the powers of his mind.

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE INNOCENT

In the impressive new war-book, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, by Erich Maria Remarque, translated from the German by A. W. Wheen (London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), a moving scene depicts the sufferings of some wounded horses (72-75). A soldier named Detering, "a farmer and very fond of horses" (73), is particularly distressed. Finally, when the poor beasts have been put out of their misery, we read (75), "Detering walks up and down cursing: 'Like to know what harm they've done.'" Though the manner of expression is so different, the spirit seems not unlike that displayed in Vergil's touching passage descriptive of the plague-stricken cattle, *Georgics* 3.525-530:

quid labor aut benefacta iuvant, quid vomere terras
invertisse gravis? Atqui non Massica Bacchi
munera, non illis epulae nocuere repostae:
frondibus et victu pascuntur simplicis herbae,
pocula sunt fontes liquidi atque exercita cursu
flumina, nec somnos abrumpit cura salubris.

HUNTER COLLEGE,
NEW YORK CITY

E. ADELAIDE HAHN